InHaig went to the War Office as director of military training. There was also argument over the placement of the reserve, XI Corps Haking with the 21st and 24th Divisions inexperienced New Army divisionswhich Haig wanted close to the front.
Yet within a few years, Haig was no longer regarded as the architect of victory in the greatest and most terrible war the British Army had ever fought. Haig knew that, if they had just kept fighting a little longer, the BEF would basically be destroyed and the war might have been ended there.
I believe that the value of the horse and the opportunity for the horse in the future are likely to be as great as ever.
He must be held accountable for the battles of the Somme and Passchendaele, but he must by the same token be given credit for the final victory. But if Haig had ever heard of Cold Harbor, he plainly did not believe its lessons applied to British soldiers.
Britain and France thought they could take advantage of a weakened enemy. This time, at the notorious Ypres salient in Flanders, he believed he would get it right and win the war. The clear reason behind the telegram was for the security of Lloyd George; however Haig had taken it that he could attack the Hindenburg brand if he sensed the necessity to do so.
A new style of conflict The pre-war British Army was small, efficient and well-experienced. This enables the Was sir douglas haig a good or bad leader to understand what manner of man he was; to appreciate also the work he did for the care of ex-soldiers.
There is nothing edifying in the biography of, say, Ambrose Burnside or any of the Union generals tormented by Stonewall Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley. They were too weak to drive the enemy entirely off the ground it had conquered inso the Germans believed they had never in fact been defeated.
Joffre was not pleased and called another conference 11 July to urge a British attack on Loos. When a breakthrough finally came at Amiens, cavalry proved extremely useful at exploiting that breakthrough, given that tanks were still slow and unreliable.
And Haig had given him every reason for believing this. At dinner afterwards Haig abandoned his prepared text, and although he wrote that his remarks were "well received" Charteris recorded that they were "unintelligible and unbearably dull" and that the visiting dignitaries fell asleep.
A group of men and women waited for him to reach, to pay their respects. Having got their own way, the French then postponed the attack as they picked new attacking ground in Champagne and arranged for extra shelling at Vimy, in both cases because of the very reasons — German-held villages and other obstructions — to which the British generals had objected.
Any diversion from it was a distraction. Kitchener met with Haig first and then with French. Haig believed that the war could only be won on the Western Front.
Therefore this controversial issue will perhaps be continuously debated. Shortage of shells meant that only a thirty-five-minute bombardment was possible but the small front of the attack gave it the concentration to succeed. So the tide turned, and with Haig still commanding the BEF, the Allies pushed the Germans back and forced first a cease-fire and then the fatally flawed Treaty of Versailles.
Haig thought Lloyd George "shifty and unreliable". Haig's records of his time supervising artillery exercises show little interest in technical matters aim, range, accuracy etc. Subsequent relations between the two men were not to be so cordial.
Kitchener, who had been invited to tour the French Army 16—19 August listened sympathetically to Joffre's suggestion that in future Joffre should set the size, dates and objectives of British offensives, although he only agreed for the Loos attack for the moment.
French protested that time for the commitment of reserves had been on the second day; when told of this by Robertson 2 Oct Haig thought this evidence of French's "unreasoning brain". When the breakthroughs failed, both battles turned into protracted efforts to wear down the enemy, resulting in the costly attrition warfare of and Haig was intolerant of what he regarded as old-fashioned opinion and not good at negotiating with strangers.
Joffre was not pleased and called another conference 11 July to urge a British attack on Loos. The Somme was an epic of both slaughter and futility; a profligate waste of men and materiel such as the world had never seen. However, there may have been no terrain along the entire plus miles of the Western Front less suited to tank warfare than the wet, low-lying ground of Flanders.
After its last attempt at piercing the German line, the French army had broken and mutinied.General Douglas Haig has become an incredibly controversial figure. Some view him as a hero who led the British to victory in the great war, others remember him for the bloody path to that victory.
Was General Haig a good or bad leader in WW1? Update Cancel. The Good: General Haig led the British to victory in World War 1.
While he. General Douglas Haig has become an incredibly controversial figure. Some view him as a hero who led the British to victory in the great war, others remember him for the bloody path to that victory. Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, chief of staff of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) and architect of the battle, evidently agreed.
On the day after the debacle, stating that the enemy “has undoubtedly been shaken and has few reserves in hand,” he discussed with. May 17, · why was general haig a bad leader? does anyone have any point on why he was a bad leader?
thank youStatus: Resolved. Published: Tue, 06 Jun The issue of Douglas Haig’s role as a general on the Western Front, during the Battle of the Somme inhas been thoroughly questioned by many historians to date. Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig and the other generals of WW1 are often thought of as incompetent and uncaring.
Is it time to re-assess this view? What, then, of the military leader who bore.Download